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The nonchalance with which this fundamental constitutional issue was already then brushed aside by the Islamists, and not enforced despite the fact that the military was still in control, did not bode well. These concerns have materialized with the new Constitution 5 . Nathan
Brown believes that there will be no repetition of an Iranian-style theocracy 6 . Yet, given that the extremist fringe has historically often succeeded in cowing moderate practices by the threat or use of violence against moderates and liberals, this is not necessarily a consolation.
In some countries, notably Pakistan, the use of doubtful 7 and harsh interpretations of Shari'ah law against non-Muslims and other Muslims in the context of, for example, the blasphemy laws and the so-called "takfir wars", occurs within an ostentatiously democratic setting which is, however, beset by radical Islamist propaganda, imams who do not shrink from praising the Islamist murderer of a moderate governor as someone who made "every Muslim proud" 8 , and
4 an uneducated as well as impoverished vast majority who lacks the intellectual wherewithal to scrutinise and where necessary, resist the messages spread by both 9 . Brown also made the important point that in Egypt the role of Al Azhar may become central to this development and that the struggle for control over it as well as its constitutional remit has already begun, with the current moderate Grand Imam Al-Tayeb still providing a bulwark against an Islamist "Durchmarsch through the institutions" 10 . The new Constitution bears Brown's predictions out 11 . Al Azhar is the oldest and quite possibly most prestigious seat of Sunni theology and learning in the world and even though not legally binding in general, its opinions will have a large impact on Sunni Muslim attitudes and policies 12 . Its 2011 declaration on the Arab Revolution 13 is a good example of the latent reform potential of the institution for the development of Islamic principles:
The forces of the revolution and reform should unite in achieving their dream of justice and freedom.
They should also avoid sectarian, ethnic, doctrinal and religious conflicts in order to preserve their national fabric and respect citizens' rights; and they should join forces to achieve a democratic transformation for the benefit of everyone, in a framework of national consensus and harmony aimed at building a future based on equality and justice. Furthermore, they must prevent the uprising to be exploited by sectarianism or denominationalism or to provoke religious sensitivities 14 .
The latter exhortation would, however, seem to have gone unheeded. To be sure, there can be no argument from the point of view of pure democratic theory that if the electorate wants a majority for Islamist parties and the outcome of the elections sanctions that desire, then democracy has prima facie worked. Interestingly in this context, as a poll in July 2011 about the constitutional referendum in Egypt and in particular Article 2, which establishes Shari'ah as the primary source of law, seems to indicate, both Muslim and Christian responses were quite similar with regard to the overall referendum and more aligned to socio-economic 20 Modern Muslim theoretical apologists of a specifically Islamic human rights discourse take, of course, a different stance and employ such concepts as the ECtHR's "margin of appreciation" doctrine to allow for accommodation of particularly Muslim approaches; see, for example, Mashood A Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law, paperback edition 2005, 219 ff at 231 ff. Baderin advocates in effect a bilateral accommodation with Islamic law striving to conform to international human rights standards, and the latter in effect granting Islamic law some leeway based on "Islamic ethical and moral values" (at 222). Baderin calls the Cairo Declaration "current codified Islamic human rights standards recognized by Muslim states" (at 48), so it would be fair to assume that they represent at least the main substance of those ethical and moral values, as the Declaration itself would seem to say in its Preamble. It is of interest to note that of the 39 instances (see page xx of the book for a list) where Baderin refers to the Cairo Declaration, only two (at 60 and 217) can be said to contain an analysis and/or critique of the Declaration, even where in the remaining 37 there are cases of a lack of a corresponding protection under the Declaration compared to international human rights law, which reinforces the conclusion that the Declaration is in Baderin's view in sync with general Islamic doctrine. In any event, the basic difference between the secular and the Islamic approach, as Baderin himself points out (at 51), is that the former is anthropocentric and the latter theocentric -and that theocentric quality, as the Premable shows, is not deistic but Islamic, in other words in a human rights system governed solely by Islamic law the God who determines the rights of humans and their ambit is the God as seen and constructed by Islam, not any other religion, and certainly not any non-religious ideology. To which extent these rights are human and/or rights is thus open to question. Baderin himself appears to advocate what he calls an "inclusive universalism" (at 28 -29) based on a "multi-cultural or cross-cultural approach" (at 28) and opines that it "may only be difficult, but not impossible" to arrive at a "universally acceptable consensus" (at 29). How far adherents of political Islam would be prepared to engage in such a mutual trade-off exercise remains to be seen -see the text around the following footnotes.
Islam(ism) and Transition -A Doubtful Process?
The See http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2012/06/12/tunisian-islamists-riot-over-art-show-they-say-insultsmuslims/. 35 See http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/opinion/the-assassination-of-chokri-belaid-in-tunisia.html?_r=0. 36 See http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/salafists-in-tunisia-riot-over-art-heresy. 37 See the telling comment at http://www.ummah.com/forum/showthread.php?313848-Egypt-MuslimBrotherhood-reassures-tourists-Alcohol-and-women-will-be-there. 38 This does not just apply to the usual suspects. i.e. the Salafis in the Middle East and Pakistan: Even respected and courted European Muslim intellectuals such as Tariq Ramadan find it difficult to come clean and renounce religion-and tradition-based gender discrimination outright, because he wants to start from within the existing texts of the Qur'an and the Sunna as well as Islamic tradition; see the chapter on the issue in his Radical Reform -Islamic Ethics and Liberation, 2009, 207 ff. and particularly at 208: "Clearly, the internal debate in the light of scriptural sources must be thought through and started from within, and it cannot simply and naturally identify with, or be assimilated with categories introduced by women and feminists in Western societies". If this sentence is to have any meaningful substance, it implies by necessity that what women want in the West, i.e. simply full equality in law with men and the right to make their own life choices, is either not something that Muslim women want (which appears doubtful), or not something that an Islamic debate "from within" can subscribe to unreservedly. If the latter is true, then the title of Ramadan's book is a multiple contradiction in terms. . 42 Yet, even in Saudi Arabia exceptions are possible if there is the necessary political will: At the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) women are allowed to drive on campus, do not have to wear a veil and can attend mixed classes with male students, something which would boggle the mind of any Saudi in a normal setting, and this has drawn the criticism of the Saudi ulama who want to have the courses vetted according to Islamic law. This has led King Abdullah to dismiss a member of the highest clerical authority, Sheikh Saad al-Shithri, who had publicly criticised the policy. -See "KAUST resets top 10 ambitions", online at http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?sectioncode=26&storycode=420231. 43 Here again, it may be apposite to refer to the 2007 Gallup Report on the views of women, where the defining element of the questioning process was the juxtaposition to Western forms of equality, and apparently Muslim women did not admire the Western view because in their eyes women were sexually degraded at the same time as being liberated to equality under law; the conceptual disjunction of the two issues did not seem to register with the respondents. Another reason given was that full equality would mean women would have to contribute to their own and the family income, something which traditional Islamic law does not require them to do at all; ibid (fn. 46 Islam has a massive international image problem based on how it is visibly practised as opposed to intellectual issues in usul al-fiqh. The problem is only at the surface the terrorist violence. The real problem is the inflexibility of those Muslims who insist on the right to live their faith in full according to their traditions, even if these clash with the values of the host society or international standards. The inflexibility is justified by divine command and thus placed beyond the reach of merely human argument. This approach is in contradiction to the principles of an open secular society which, and that is the rub, was built on the experience of centuries of oppression based on religion, for example in Europe, this time by corporate Christianity. An open secular society works on the principle that no-one gets to live out his own ideas in full as soon as that clashes with the spheres of others, and it mostly will clash somewhere. An Islam which is not prepared to compromise because of its own perceived superiority does not fit into an open society, but destroys it from within by using the openness for its own ends. The main worry of those people who subscribe to the idea of an open society is thus not really the spectre of Islamic overpopulation as a demographic threat based on Muslim birth rates. It is the erosion of their own freedom through the (ab-)use of the very liberties provided by that same open society, by persons who do not want to sacrifice anything of their own sphere so as to contribute something to rather than demand more from society. Every position secured by Muslim human rights litigation also means a restriction on what the open society and its members can do with regard to Muslims. The record of Muslim abidance by decisions which do not go in their favour is far from perfect; at this stage the superior divine command is often mobilised and in some cases the state is more or less openly challenged into enforcement. To lay the blame for this concern only at the feet of the people who are worried about the developments and to accuse them simply of uninformed Islamophobia is disingenuous and at worst obfuscatory propaganda. 47 It is often overlooked that the Taliban themselves were a transitional Muslim regime after the previous government and the Mujahidin had been ousted. This criticism overlooks the fact that creating and sustaining fear of possible retaliation is an undeniable part of the arsenal of Islamist propaganda itself, and we have by now arrived at a stage where there is no more need for explicit threats, and that those who do not expressly make them can actually brand themselves as moderates. Moderate Muslims in the proper sense of the word, who may merely react in a seriously offended manner, as a devout traditional Christian might, do thus not have to threaten or even contemplate reprisals themselves because the audience will by default assume that such a reaction may be in the realm of the possible, based on narratives about other Muslims who have, sometimes wholly unexpectedly, reverted to violence. In such a situation it is psychologically hardly helpful to the debate to distinguish between religious and traditional or ethnic sources of behaviour and to blame the violent part wholly on the latter. In any event, there is some evidence that at least as far as folk-Islam as opposed to scholarly Islam is concerned, the two have merged in the Muslim consciousness, with the consequence that less well-educated Muslims will themselves be unable to make that distinction anymore -compare Sami Zubaida, Beyond Islam -A New Understanding of the Middle East, 2011, 111. Similar phenomena can be noticed in most if not all scripture-based religions after they have had sufficient time to build up settled rituals and practices which often mix with pre-existing folklore. It is then these rituals and practices which transport religious identity to a possibly larger degree than the finer points of the doctrinal teachings with which many believers will be unfamiliar to begin with. 13 also and to a large part about religious psychology and parental as well as peer-group based behavioural conditioning. Other fundamental questions must be asked in this context: Are Muslims willing to accept that it must be permissible to question the tenets of their faith, and to subject even its primary sources to historical-critical research which does not proceed from the premise that they are sacrosanct in their textual integrity and that any instances of vagueness or inconsistency merely await the right interpreter? Are they prepared to subject them to an external criticism to which the Christian holy scriptures, for example, have been subjected for many decades 57 ? Are they prepared to accept that non-Muslims do not have to This analysis may not be entirely on point for the foreign-educated intellectual urban elite, but it is certainly in resonance with the appearance of the thought processes manifested by many if not most of the traditionally trained ulama, and, of course, the less well-educated majority of the population who will likely accept anything their imams tell them almost unquestioningly.
Ambiguous Islamic attitudes especially towards Christianity
The two verses from the Qur'an cited at the beginning of this paper are evidence of a conflicted stance of Islam even towards one of its Abrahamitic sister religions. The reference 61 Ibid, 80 -81. presence in the Palace to find out whether he could obtain money from him. The conversation soon strays to Saladin asking him which is the true religion, and Nathan responds with the Parable of the Three Rings. The parable merits being reproduced here verbatim:
NATHAN: In days of yore, there dwelt in eastern lands a man who had a ring of priceless worth received from hands beloved. The stone it held, an opal, shed a hundred colors fair, and had the magic power that he who wore it, trusting its strength, was loved of God and men. No wonder therefore that this eastern man would never cease to wear it; and took pains to keep it in his household for all time.
He left the ring to that one of his sons he loved the best; providing that in turn that son bequeath to his most favorite son the ring; and thus, regardless of his birth, the dearest son, by virtue of the ring, should be the head, the prince of all his house. You follow, Sultan.
SALADIN: Perfectly. Continue! NATHAN: At last this ring, passed on from son to son, descended to a father of three sons; all three of whom were duly dutiful, all three of whom in consequence he needs must love alike. But yet from time to time, now this, now that one, now the third -as each might be with him alone, the other two not sharing then his overflowing heart seemed worthiest of the ring; and so to each he promised it, in pious frailty. This lasted while it might. The symbolism could not be stronger against the background of the rationale of the Ring Parable: All three faiths are members of one family. Indeed, this seems to have been the primary intention of Lessing in writing his Nathan. As Kuschel argues, Lessing wanted to impress upon his contemporary Christian audience that it was God's will that all three religions be accepted and regarded by each other as equals, not merely tolerated by whichever was the dominant religion in a certain geographical area or at a certain time 72 . The way for Lessing to achieve this result is twofold: He firstly posits that the true religion cannot be determined because all three of them are based on faith: not only faith in God, but also faith in the people in whose traditions we are raised. Secondly, flowing from the first and in a heretofore historically unusual twist, Lessing concludes that we have no reason to treat a person of another faith as in any way inferior, but quite to the contrary that the love of God should exhort the adherents of each religion to strive for good deeds and compassion towards and acceptance of other faiths. In order to fulfil this demand of God's love we must step outside of our own religious frame of reference and allow for the possibility that either the others are right or that we are all right (or all wrong), and that God may accept adherents of all faiths as long as they honestly follow their own. In other words, the heuristic process cannot proceed only from within one's own religion. One must learn to live with the tension of living one's own faith as if it were the right one and allowing at the same time for the possibility that it is either wrong or not the only right one. The depth of one's personal conviction is not a gauge of the degree of the trueness of one's religion. In consequence, it means we cannot impose our religion on others -or as the Qur'an says, "There is no compulsion in religion" 73 . Only in this way will the "true" religion finally show itself -and it seems fair to assume that Lessing had no illusions about only one of them ever reaching that stage short of another direct divine intervention. This is where Nathan and the Qur'an meet in 
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entire nation because they view themselves as being in sole possession of the ultimate truth which they (ideally) have to make everyone accept -and the more conservative they are, the more they go wrong.
The historical background to the Ring Parable
The above could be seen as yet another Christian or Western attempt to prove the inferiority The Patriarch goes on to state that with the dawn the true owner of the pearl would become known, and he would be happy and all the others sad and dismayed; in that sense the story 21 remains behind the ambition of Lessing's version described above. However, the Caliph then reminds the Patriarch that "in this world, the owners of the pearl are unknown", a remarkable admission in itself for a Muslim, to which the Patriarch replies that one can know them in part, namely through "good deeds and pious action". The Caliph ends the dispute by saying "we have hope in God that we are the owners of the pearl and that we hold it in our hands".
Kuschel emphasises the use of the word "hope", which by necessity denotes the acceptance that there is no certainty 77 .
The second example is set again in Baghdad, this time in the 10 th century, and is related by a man called Abu Sulaiman. The story concerns a sceptic who states that his scepticism is based on the realisation that all religions have equal claim and arguments. When asked why he then still adheres to his own religion, he recounts the Parable of the Caravanserai 78 :
"I am like a man who went into a caravanserai to ...seek refuge in the shade on a sunny day.
The landlord of the caravanserai brought him to a room without asking whether he liked it.
While he stayed there, lo!, a cloud came and it began to pour down. In his room it began to leak from the ceiling and he looked for other rooms, but found that they also leaked. The yard of the house was covered in mud. So he decided that it was best to stay in his room, be at rest and not get his feet muddy by walking through the yard in order to find another room. ... So also I: I was born without reason, and then my parents brought me into this religion without me having the opportunity to test it beforehand. When I did I found that it worked like all the others and that it behoved me better to remain in it, rather than to disown it; because I could only have given it up and chosen another one by adopting the latter and preferring it to the former. However, I did not find any argument for the latter without immediately finding an argument that another could have held against it."
This example proceeds from human skepticism about our capacity of finding "the" truth.
Here, the loyalty to one's own "inherited" religion is based on the absence of a better alternative 79 , a theme reminiscent of Nathan's question about how we can distrust our own forefathers' traditions or ask others to distrust theirs. However, as was already indicated above, in order to be able to ask that question, we must first subject our own religion to the scrutiny through the eyes of others.
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The third example is that of Ibn Arabi, In the context of a transitional scenario from the 12 th century, Lessing's play Nathan the Wise was juxtaposed to the Islamist and traditionalist Islamic religious psychology, in order to
show that there are ways of living one's own religion while accepting and not merely tolerating the potential validity of those of others. The important point to be made was firstly that Lessing wrote the piece with a decidedly pro-Islamic intention and based on his rather extensive knowledge -for his time -of Islam. Secondly, he could refer to previous versions of the narration which were set in a Muslim environment themselves. Thirdly, it was set in a scenario which would these days count as a post-conflict situation and can, fourthly, thus give an example of how to approach the matter of religious diversity in the pursuit of the Arab transition which will in all likelihood also be an Islamic transition. Current events in Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere do not allow for any reasonably safe prediction of how this transition will unfold. So far it seems that regrettably a reporter from Al-Jazeera, who visited Durham University some years ago, is being proven right in that he said that the
